Rediff On The NeT: Betting scandal in Indian cricket

Why won't the BCCI play Pakistan in the UAE?

Before I start this comment, let me point out that I believe that modern cricket is a massive business, and the pursuit of money and expansion of business provides the clues to most moves made in the game these days, rather than political or nationalistic issues.
Over the past few months I've had many debates on the issue of India’s tour to Pakistan. There are several reasons offered for all the issues that have taken place, and since I am not convinced by any of them, I’ll be discussing them here.
  1. Pakistan is an evil, terror supporting state: this excuse is given quite often. After 2008, there is no stomach to play the team whose state is seen in India as directly responsible for the Mumbai atrocities. This reason is also offered sometimes when explaining why Pakistani players are excluded from the IPL. IMO this excuse is bullshit. For starters, having hosted Pakistan in 2013, there is already a precedent in place, which is further cemented by the fact that India have played Pakistan in various tournaments (World Cup, Asia Cup) in the years since the attacks. So clearly if there was a moral reason for not wanting to tour Pakistan, it is undercut by these realities. Indeed, I am not sure what message is sent out by having Pakistani coaches and umpires over regularly for the IPL – Wasim and Ramiz being over don’t seem to violate ethics but Misbah does? Most importantly, if this is the issue then why doesn’t the Indian government, whose permission is frequently invoked by the BCCI, come out and say something? Surely New Delhi’s foreign policy towards Islamabad outranks cricketing matters, and if the Modi government wants to freeze out Pakistan, wouldn’t they mention that?
  2. The UAE is a haven of fixing, and Shashank is cleaning up shop: this theory emerged after the BCCI’s strange non-explanations for not touring UAE, and this piece puts together various reasons to explain this. Once again though, this line of reasoning is untenable. For starters, the Pakistan team has had no accusations of fixing – save for a scurrilous report in the Daily Mail that has so far been dismissed – in the years since the 2010 scandal. So unlike that piece’s implication, claiming that Pakistani players are suspicious is baseless. Most importantly, how exactly would moving the players away from the UAE and to Sri Lanka make a difference? The illegal betting market exists primarily in India, and most transactions are not affected by the location of the match. If the BCCI is worried about player contact, what exactly does Sri Lanka have to offer that the UAE doesn’t? if anything, the most prominent fixing scandals in recent years have happened in the IPL, in India. First there was the case where Sreesanth (and others) were banned, and then the whole betting scandal where the fixing element was left confined to a sealed envelope. Many people on twitter have pointed to Shashank’s desire for cleaning up the BCCI as the reason he’s avoiding the UAE. However, given the response (last paragraph) to the MoU (the BCCI said that since it was signed by Srini, they don’t recognise it) it seems that this is the same old pattern of the new BCCI boss undoing and opposing everything done by his predecessor.
  3. Ten Sports and BCCI have issues: The series in SL will also be covered by Ten.
  4. There’s ISIS in Dubai: security concerns have literally not stopped anyone in the world form going here, not even England or Australia or Rihanna, so this is bullshit.
  5. Dawood Ibrahim’s in UAE and other conspiracies: if the matters here are truly related to matters beyond cricket, then its unclear why either the BCCI doesn’t make reference to this or the Indian government itself comes out and says this. Indeed, given Modi’s triumphant visit to the region, you would think the GoI would have plenty of leverage to get what it wants. That may not extend to getting D-bhai, but can surely guarantee whatever assurances the board wants.
  6. Shashank is very keen on establishing the Indian home season: this has been said by some journos, which if true represents a rather dickheaded impulse to ignore previously signed agreements and what is known to be the home tour of the other side. This reason also fails to explain why they would agree to Sri Lanka then.
As you might be able to tell, there is also little monetary incentive at play amongst any of the options laid out here, and as I mentioned, I’m usually prone to seeing those as the main reason for driving such things. However, in this case it could also be an issue of incompetence and poor communication. Many people believed that the BJP government wanted to wait until the outcome of the Bihar elections before deciding on the tour, and that’s why the board spent a lot of time vacillating. As some had predicted, the decision to go ahead with the series was announced after the elections. However, the opposition to touring UAE was more surprising to me. My current, completely speculative take is that the BCCI was first waiting on the government, and anticipating that the much-predicted BJP win in Bihar would lead to a more assertive stance vs Pakistan, leading to a cancelled tour. Even if that wasn’t the case, they were definitely waiting on the polls and the government’s reaction. Meanwhile, within the board itself, the new boss was looking to clean out the mess made by Srini and stamp his own authority on the job. One of these ways was to establish an Indian home test season, which would consolidate its Test marketing and sales and would require regular home series. Knowing that the PCB’s finances (like those of just about every other cricketing entity in the world right now) depended on the tour, the board thought they would be able to strongarm their way to an Indian-hosted ‘home’ series for Pakistan, and hence kick off the Indian home season concept in a dramatic and lucrative way. At this point, the Shiv Sena fiasco and Shahryar threatening a WT20 boycott necessitated damage control. By now, the BJP lost Bihar as well, leading to some of the party’s old guard calling out its newer hawks. The political climate for the series was now more favourable, and so there was no valid reason left to call the tour off. Going to the UAE however would be too embarrassing, and more importantly, damaging to the BCCI’s negotiating strength in the future. This led to Sri Lanka emerging as the compromise situation. My only issue with this scenario is that it fails to explain why the BCCI didn’t just tell the PCB to fuck off at any point. Given its dealings with most of the world in the recent past, it hasn’t made sense why the board has let this drag out all the way here. It clearly has the clout and the temperament to bully its way. If, as per my reasoning, the refusal to tour the UAE was largely face-saving, then why didn’t the board just call it off altogether? As a friend has already mentioned, it still feels like the BCCI is looking for an excuse to get out of the current series, and could use political reasons to do so. The recent changes at the top means that Shashank would want any resumptions to happen on deals signed on his terms and conditions, and this one has come along too quickly for the board to react. TL;DR all the political and fixing reasons being offered for why the BCCI won’t send a team to the UAE are largely untenable. My claim is that a new board wants to set up a new series at a later date, and is also avoiding this one due to association with the past chief.
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The National Identity IV: India’s original “Cold Start” and the day the Indian military nearly went rogue

Arun Singh strode away into the mountains of Almora, the heartland of Kumaon. If it felt like a betrayal of his close friend Rajiv Gandhi, it was at least a decision taken with a heavy heart. Thrice, he had been persuaded by Prime Minister Gandhi to continue as Minister of State for defense, but with the weight of the Bofors scandal sagging shoulders in the Ministry of Defense, he thought it was best to go. He had wrenched himself away to an altogether different world, far removed from Delhi not just in distance but even more so in time, and he had no intention of returning.
The year was 1988. A year earlier he helped oversee an operation which brought a freshly nuclear armed Pakistan and India to the brink of war.
“Thence north to the glaciers” — Simla Agreement, 1972
The intervening years between 1974, when India displayed her nuclear might, and 1987 were largely peaceful, in the conventional sense. India and Pakistan didn’t engage in open conflict, but as the arms race between the two neighbours heated up, so did the misadventures. In Operation Meghdoot in 1984, India wrestled control of the highest battlefield in the world, Siachen Glacier. With the Simla Agreement in 1972, failing to demarcate Indian and Pakistani territory, India for once, assumed a defensively-offensive posture to capture the area beyond point NJ9842, referred to as “thence north to the glaciers” in the Simla Agreement. As India had preempted Pakistan, India had the advantage of commanding the heights and used it to devastating effect to counter wave after wave of Pakistani attempts to gain a foothold on the glacier. More than thirty years on, India still controls the entire Siachen Glacier. Perhaps buoyed by this daring manoeuvre, the Indian Army wasted little time in developing blueprints for future “preemptive” and “defensively-offensive” strikes. The Indian Government had, since Independence, assumed a purely defensive posture but under Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji, the military was at least ready to showcase its conventional might, as a sign of deterrence to Pakistan.
"This is not a third-world army, this is a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French.” — A Western diplomat who attended the Operational manoeuvres, 1987
Moving on from the initial three phases of the Operation which involved consultations with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the first phase to sand modelling in the third, the Army entered Phase 4. It was the largest troop mobilization since World War II, larger than any NATO massing of troops. The operation involved moving 500,000–800,000 troops to the international border with Pakistan in East to West, South to West and North to West manoeuvres. The year was 1986 and the operation was codenamed Brass Tacks.
In fact, even though it was an internal exercise, this was India’s first “Cold Start”. General Sundarji was the Chief of Army Staff who lent his name to the Sundarji doctrine — involving three strike corps based in the hinterland (Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura), which having evaded first brush with the enemy (the corps closer to the border would take the first hits), would then strike Pakistan in a sledgehammer like motion. This doctrine would ultimately lead to India’s failure in Operation Parakram exactly 15 years later.
Operation Brass Tacks was a Ministry of Defense operation/exercise, championed by General Sundarji and the Minister of State in the defense ministry Arun Singh, to simulate the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces. This came on the back of India’s Siachen Glacier mission and a long running Pakistani backed militancy in Punjab. This was, on the record at least, meant purely as an internal exercise to demonstrate the new armoured and light infantry capabilities of the Indian Army. The troop concentration was in the Indian state of Rajasthan and on the other side of the border lay the Pakistani province of Sindh.
Such a large troop movement would obviously not go unnoticed in Pakistan, and the Pakistani President and Chief of Army Staff, General Zia responded by moving three of his corps to the international border. Pakistan had misread the exercise as a declaration of war. He also activated the reserves and massed troops along the northern borders with India. Close to a million troops stood within firing range of each other, waiting for the shot across the bow. One bullet fired and one casualty, and all bets would have been off from the desert to the high mountains.
“Hoon is taking us to war” — Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Mani Shankar Aiyar, December 1986
The Prime Minister was his own Defense Minister at the time, so what is definitely clear is that he knew about Operation Brass Tacks. Where the water turns murky is when the operational manoeuvres began in Phase 4, in December 1986. Allegations by the Prime Minister’s office say the Army pushed an internal exercise into a war mobilization, and Rajiv Gandhi, away on holiday, was unaware of it.
Scholarly evidence rests on the side of the Indian Army that Operation Brass Tacks was purely meant as an internal exercise. Whilst, the Indian Army wanted to display to Pakistan that the bleeding militancy in Punjab had not blunted India’s conventional forces, the intention was never to incite war. Lieutenant General Hoon was the Western Army commander at the time, and was in charge of the entire operation. He, to this day, remains convinced that General Sundarji wanted to go to war with Pakistan and the operation was meant to incite a first strike from Pakistan. A hot line between the Military Operations Directorates of the two nations were never opened. For an exercise of this scale, it is often the first task accomplished and it is hard to term this an “oversight”. Rajiv Gandhi has shades of a callow JFK, in that, his generals didn’t directly disobey him or misinform him but were more than happy to create situations in which the nation would be forced to go to war. Shielding the Army was Rajiv Gandhi’s closest friend, and fellow Doon School and Cambridge alumnus, Minister of State Arun Singh.
Rajiv Gandhi diffused the situation by inviting General Zia to lunch in Delhi, under the pretext of watching a cricket match. In February 1987, the two sides agreed to withdraw 150,000 troops from Kashmir. The retreat agreement for troops in the deserts of Rajasthan was reached in March 1987, but India continued the final manoeuvres, asserting that Pakistan had no reason to feel provoked. The final manoeuvres were overseen by foreign diplomats, including one Pakistani diplomat, in a rare Confidence Building Measure. Even though the situation mildly flared up again in late March 1987, when Pakistan’s nuclear scientist AQ Khan said that Pakistan now had nuclear weapons, the worst was over. The two nations had pulled back from a war which, in all likelihood, would have involved battlefield nuclear weapons.
“Pakistan’s nuclear escalation ladder has only one rung” — Shireen Mazari, political scientist and central spokesperson of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
This points back to the original question posed in Part III , where was the civil military coordination? Without any knowledge of what strategic goals we might have, the Indian general, even if successful in instigating a Pakistani first strike, would have been forced to retreat from Pakistani territory without anything more than tactical and operational victories. Also called, pyrrhic.
India’s difficulty has always been moving from a purely defensive mode to the defensively-offensive mode. The Indian armed forces have always known the need for this, but the civil leadership has never humoured the armed forces.
Operation Brass Tacks was a game of chess. The general, according to some more reports, hoped that Pakistan would view this exercise as an announcement of war, and true to form land the first strikes. This would give India justification for attacking Pakistan. It was envisioned that India would lay waste to Pakistan’s retaliatory apparatus in multiple deep incursions into Pakistani territory, but more importantly destroy their nuclear facilities. A Pakistan, now split into two, would be forced to come to the negotiating table. Although it would have been viewed as an extremely hostile move by the world community, India could have potentially destroyed Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. India would not have had to fight the Kashmir insurgency and the Kargil war under the shadow of a nuclear war, always careful to not take “that one step” which would give Pakistan justification for using nuclear weapons.
“He has been vetted by our Intelligence agency and has been sworn to the Official Secrets Act” — Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 2000
Operation Parakram in December 2001, exactly fifteen years on from Operation Brass Tacks, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war and only a US intervention saved the day. It was the second time in fifteen years when close to a million troops faced each other along an international border. The US intervention came about because the Sundarji doctrine took three weeks to implement, enough time for General Musharraf to seek US help and to make his famous “denouncing the Jihadis” speech.
A little known personality was brought back into India’s decision making loop during the Kargil War, two years ago. He was inducted into the MEA as Officer on special Duty with undefined powers and functions. He was subsequently made advisor in the Ministry of External Affairs with the rank of a minister of state, with doubtful constitutional status. When questioned on his appointment in the Parliament, Jaswant Singh would go on to make that famous remark. With Defence Minister George Fernandes sidelined from the decision making process by Prime Minister Vajpayee, the freshly inducted man would go on to be at or near the helm of two of India’s most sensitive exercises, operations post 1987. Bought back into the loop, to complete General Sundarji’s legacy, was none other than Arun Singh, the recluse of Almora.
Rather than institutionalizing decision making we, again and again, personalize it. There in lies our greatest folly.
submitted by _Zorawar_ to india [link] [comments]

The National Identity IV: India's original "Cold Start" and the day the military nearly went rogue

Arun Singh strode away into the mountains of Almora, the heartland of Kumaon. If it felt like a betrayal of his close friend Rajiv Gandhi, it was at least a decision taken with a heavy heart. Thrice, he had been persuaded by Prime Minister Gandhi to continue as Minister of State for defense, but with the weight of the Bofors scandal sagging shoulders in the Ministry of Defense, he thought it was best to go. He had wrenched himself away to an altogether different world, far removed from Delhi not just in distance but even more so in time, and he had no intention of returning.
The year was 1988. A year earlier he helped oversee an operation which brought a freshly nuclear armed Pakistan and India to the brink of war.
“Thence north to the glaciers” — Simla Agreement, 1972
The intervening years between 1974, when India displayed her nuclear might, and 1987 were largely peaceful, in the conventional sense. India and Pakistan didn’t engage in open conflict, but as the arms race between the two neighbours heated up, so did the misadventures. In Operation Meghdoot in 1984, India wrestled control of the highest battlefield in the world, Siachen Glacier. With the Simla Agreement in 1972, failing to demarcate Indian and Pakistani territory, India for once, assumed a defensively-offensive posture to capture the area beyond point NJ9842, referred to as “thence north to the glaciers” in the Simla Agreement. As India had preempted Pakistan, India had the advantage of commanding the heights and used it to devastating effect to counter wave after wave of Pakistani attempts to gain a foothold on the glacier. More than thirty years on, India still controls the entire Siachen Glacier. Perhaps buoyed by this daring manoeuvre, the Indian Army wasted little time in developing blueprints for future “preemptive” and “defensively-offensive” strikes. The Indian Government had, since Independence, assumed a purely defensive posture but under Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji, the military was at least ready to showcase its conventional might, as a sign of deterrence to Pakistan.
"This is not a third-world army, this is a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French.” — A Western diplomat who attended the Operational manoeuvres, 1987
Moving on from the initial three phases of the Operation which involved consultations with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the first phase to sand modelling in the third, the Army entered Phase 4. It was the largest troop mobilization since World War II, larger than any NATO massing of troops. The operation involved moving 500,000–800,000 troops to the international border with Pakistan in East to West, South to West and North to West manoeuvres. The year was 1986 and the operation was codenamed Brass Tacks.
In fact, even though it was an internal exercise, this was India’s first “Cold Start”. General Sundarji was the Chief of Army Staff who lent his name to the Sundarji doctrine — involving three strike corps based in the hinterland (Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura), which having evaded first brush with the enemy (the corps closer to the border would take the first hits), would then strike Pakistan in a sledgehammer like motion. This doctrine would ultimately lead to India’s failure in Operation Parakram exactly 15 years later.
Operation Brass Tacks was a Ministry of Defense operation/exercise, championed by General Sundarji and the Minister of State in the defense ministry Arun Singh, to simulate the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces. This came on the back of India’s Siachen Glacier mission and a long running Pakistani backed militancy in Punjab. This was, on the record at least, meant purely as an internal exercise to demonstrate the new armoured and light infantry capabilities of the Indian Army. The troop concentration was in the Indian state of Rajasthan and on the other side of the border lay the Pakistani province of Sindh.
Such a large troop movement would obviously not go unnoticed in Pakistan, and the Pakistani President and Chief of Army Staff, General Zia responded by moving three of his corps to the international border. Pakistan had misread the exercise as a declaration of war. He also activated the reserves and massed troops along the northern borders with India. Close to a million troops stood within firing range of each other, waiting for the shot across the bow. One bullet fired and one casualty, and all bets would have been off from the desert to the high mountains.
“Hoon is taking us to war” — Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Mani Shankar Aiyar, December 1986
The Prime Minister was his own Defense Minister at the time, so what is definitely clear is that he knew about Operation Brass Tacks. Where the water turns murky is when the operational manoeuvres began in Phase 4, in December 1986. Allegations by the Prime Minister’s office say the Army pushed an internal exercise into a war mobilization, and Rajiv Gandhi, away on holiday, was unaware of it.
Scholarly evidence rests on the side of the Indian Army that Operation Brass Tacks was purely meant as an internal exercise. Whilst, the Indian Army wanted to display to Pakistan that the bleeding militancy in Punjab had not blunted India’s conventional forces, the intention was never to incite war. Lieutenant General Hoon was the Western Army commander at the time, and was in charge of the entire operation. He, to this day, remains convinced that General Sundarji wanted to go to war with Pakistan and the operation was meant to incite a first strike from Pakistan. A hot line between the Military Operations Directorates of the two nations were never opened. For an exercise of this scale, it is often the first task accomplished and it is hard to term this an “oversight”. Rajiv Gandhi has shades of a callow JFK, in that, his generals didn’t directly disobey him or misinform him but were more than happy to create situations in which the nation would be forced to go to war. Shielding the Army was Rajiv Gandhi’s closest friend, and fellow Doon School and Cambridge alumnus, Minister of State Arun Singh.
Rajiv Gandhi diffused the situation by inviting General Zia to lunch in Delhi, under the pretext of watching a cricket match. In February 1987, the two sides agreed to withdraw 150,000 troops from Kashmir. The retreat agreement for troops in the deserts of Rajasthan was reached in March 1987, but India continued the final manoeuvres, asserting that Pakistan had no reason to feel provoked. The final manoeuvres were overseen by foreign diplomats, including one Pakistani diplomat, in a rare Confidence Building Measure. Even though the situation mildly flared up again in late March 1987, when Pakistan’s nuclear scientist AQ Khan said that Pakistan now had nuclear weapons, the worst was over. The two nations had pulled back from a war which, in all likelihood, would have involved battlefield nuclear weapons.
“Pakistan’s nuclear escalation ladder has only one rung” — Shireen Mazari, political scientist and central spokesperson of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
This points back to the original question posed in Part III , where was the civil military coordination? Without any knowledge of what strategic goals we might have, the Indian general, even if successful in instigating a Pakistani first strike, would have been forced to retreat from Pakistani territory without anything more than tactical and operational victories. Also called, pyrrhic.
India’s difficulty has always been moving from a purely defensive mode to the defensively-offensive mode. The Indian armed forces have always known the need for this, but the civil leadership has never humoured the armed forces.
Operation Brass Tacks was a game of chess. The general, according to some more reports, hoped that Pakistan would view this exercise as an announcement of war, and true to form land the first strikes. This would give India justification for attacking Pakistan. It was envisioned that India would lay waste to Pakistan’s retaliatory apparatus in multiple deep incursions into Pakistani territory, but more importantly destroy their nuclear facilities. A Pakistan, now split into two, would be forced to come to the negotiating table. Although it would have been viewed as an extremely hostile move by the world community, India could have potentially destroyed Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. India would not have had to fight the Kashmir insurgency and the Kargil war under the shadow of a nuclear war, always careful to not take “that one step” which would give Pakistan justification for using nuclear weapons.
“He has been vetted by our Intelligence agency and has been sworn to the Official Secrets Act” — Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 2000
Operation Parakram in December 2001, exactly fifteen years on from Operation Brass Tacks, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war and only a US intervention saved the day. It was the second time in fifteen years when close to a million troops faced each other along an international border. The US intervention came about because the Sundarji doctrine took three weeks to implement, enough time for General Musharraf to seek US help and to make his famous “denouncing the Jihadis” speech.
A little known personality was brought back into India’s decision making loop during the Kargil War, two years ago. He was inducted into the MEA as Officer on special Duty with undefined powers and functions. He was subsequently made advisor in the Ministry of External Affairs with the rank of a minister of state, with doubtful constitutional status. When questioned on his appointment in the Parliament, Jaswant Singh would go on to make that famous remark. With Defence Minister George Fernandes sidelined from the decision making process by Prime Minister Vajpayee, the freshly inducted man would go on to be at or near the helm of two of India’s most sensitive exercises, operations post 1987. Bought back into the loop, to complete General Sundarji’s legacy, was none other than Arun Singh, the recluse of Almora.
Rather than institutionalizing decision making we, again and again, personalize it. There in lies our greatest folly.
The National Identity IV
submitted by _Zorawar_ to IndiaSpeaks [link] [comments]

H, I am back with my friend's new post on National Identity series, he wants some feedback

Arun Singh strode away into the mountains of Almora, the heartland of Kumaon. If it felt like a betrayal of his close friend Rajiv Gandhi, it was at least a decision taken with a heavy heart. Thrice, he had been persuaded by Prime Minister Gandhi to continue as Minister of State for defense, but with the weight of the Bofors scandal sagging shoulders in the Ministry of Defense, he thought it was best to go. He had wrenched himself away to an altogether different world, far removed from Delhi not just in distance but even more so in time, and he had no intention of returning.
The year was 1988. A year earlier he helped oversee an operation which brought a freshly nuclear armed Pakistan and India to the brink of war.
"Thence north to the glaciers" - Simla Agreement, 1972
The intervening years between 1974, when India displayed her nuclear might, and 1987 were largely peaceful, in the conventional sense. India and Pakistan didn't engage in open conflict, but as the arms race between the two neighbours heated up, so did the misadventures. In Operation Meghdoot in 1984, India wrestled control of the highest battlefield in the world, Siachen Glacier. With the Simla Agreement in 1972, failing to demarcate Indian and Pakistani territory, India for once, assumed a defensively-offensive posture to capture the area beyond point NJ9842, referred to as "thence north to the glaciers" in the Simla Agreement. As India had preempted Pakistan, India had the advantage of commanding the heights and used it to devastating effect to counter wave after wave of Pakistani attempts to gain a foothold on the glacier. More than thirty years on, India still controls the entire Siachen Glacier.
Perhaps buoyed by this daring manoeuvre, the Indian Army wasted little time in developing blueprints for future "preemptive" and "defensively-offensive" strikes. The Indian Government had, since Independence, assumed a purely defensive posture but under Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji, the military was at least ready to showcase its conventional might, as a sign of deterrence to Pakistan.
''This is not a third-world army, this is a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French." - A Western diplomat who attended the Operational manoeuvres, 1987
Moving on from the initial three phases of the Operation which involved consultations with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the first phase to sand modelling in the third, the Army entered Phase 4. It was the largest troop mobilization since World War II, larger than any NATO massing of troops. The operation involved moving 500,000-800,000 troops to the international border with Pakistan in East to West, South to West and North to West manoeuvres. The year was 1986 and the operation was codenamed Brass Tacks.
In fact, even though it was an internal exercise, this was India's first "Cold Start". General Sundarji was the Chief of Army Staff who lent his name to the Sundarji doctrine - involving three strike corps based in the hinterland (Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura), which having evaded first brush with the enemy (the corps closer to the border would take the first hits), would then strike Pakistan in a sledgehammer like motion. This doctrine would ultimately lead to India's failure in Operation Parakram exactly 15 years later.
Operation Brass Tacks was a Ministry of Defense operation/exercise, championed by General Sundarji and the Minister of State in the defense ministry Arun Singh, to simulate the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces. This came on the back of India's Siachen Glacier mission and a long running Pakistani backed militancy in Punjab. This was, on the record at least, meant purely as an internal exercise to demonstrate the new armoured and light infantry capabilities of the Indian Army. The troop concentration was in the Indian state of Rajasthan and on the other side of the border lay the Pakistani province of Sindh.
Such a large troop movement would obviously not go unnoticed in Pakistan, and the Pakistani President and Chief of Army Staff, General Zia responded by moving three of his corps to the international border. Pakistan had misread the exercise as a declaration of war. He also activated the reserves and massed troops along the northern borders with India. Close to a million troops stood within firing range of each other, waiting for the shot across the bow. One bullet fired and one casualty, and all bets would have been off from the desert to the high mountains.
"Hoon is taking us to war" - Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Mani Shankar Aiyar, December 1986
The Prime Minister was his own Defense Minister at the time, so what is definitely clear is that he knew about Operation Brass Tacks. Where the water turns murky is when the operational manoeuvres began in Phase 4, in December 1986. Allegations by the Prime Minister's office say the Army pushed an internal exercise into a war mobilization, and Rajiv Gandhi, away on holiday, was unaware of it.
Scholarly evidence rests on the side of the Indian Army that Operation Brass Tacks was purely meant as an internal exercise. Whilst, the Indian Army wanted to display to Pakistan that the bleeding militancy in Punjab had not blunted India's conventional forces, the intention was never to incite war. Lieutenant General Hoon was the Western Army commander at the time, and was in charge of the entire operation. He, to this day, remains convinced that General Sundarji wanted to go to war with Pakistan and the operation was meant to incite a first strike from Pakistan. A hot line between the Military Operations Directorates of the two nations were never opened. For an exercise of this scale, it is often the first task accomplished and it is hard to term this an "oversight". Rajiv Gandhi has shades of a callow JFK, in that, his generals didn't directly disoby him or misinform him but were more than happy to create situations in which the nation would be forced to go to war. Shielding the Army was Rajiv Gandhi's closest friend, and fellow Doon School and Cambridge alumnus, Minister of State Arun Singh.
Rajiv Gandhi diffused the situation by inviting General Zia to lunch in Delhi, under the pretext of watching a cricket match. In February 1987, the two sides agreed to withdraw 150,000 troops from Kashmir. The retreat agreement for troops in the deserts of Rajasthan was reached in March 1987, but India continued the final manoeuvres, asserting that Pakistan had no reason to feel provoked. The final manoeuvres were overseen by foreign diplomats, including one Pakistani diplomat, in a rare Confidence Building Measure. Even though the situation mildly flared up again in late March 1987, when Pakistan's nuclear scientist AQ Khan said that Pakistan now had nuclear weapons, the worst was over. The two nations had pulled back from a war which, in all likelihood, would have involved battlefield nuclear weapons.
"Pakistan's nuclear escalation ladder has only one rung" - Shireen Mazari,political scientist and central spokesperson of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
This points back to the original question posed in Part I, where was the civil military coordination? Without any knowledge of what strategic goals we might have, the Indian general, even if successful in instigating a Pakistani first strike, would have been forced to retreat from Pakistani territory without anything more than tactical and operational victories. Also called, pyrrhic. India's difficulty has always been moving from a purely defensive mode to the defensively-offensive mode. The Indian armed forces have always known the need for this, but the civil leadership has never humoured the armed forces.
Operation Brass Tacks was a game of chess. The general, according to some more reports, hoped that Pakistan would view this exercise as an announcement of war, and true to form land the first strikes. This would give India justification for attacking Pakistan. It was envisioned that India would lay waste to Pakistan's retaliatory apparatus in multiple deep incursions into Pakistani territory, but more importantly destroy their nuclear facilities. A Pakistan, now split into two, would be forced to come to the negotiating table. Although it would have been viewed as an extremely hostile move by the world community, India could have potentially destroyed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. India would not have had to fight the Kashmir insurgency and the Kargil war under the shadow of a nuclear war, always careful to not take "that one step" which would give Pakistan justification for using nuclear weapons.
"He has been vetted by our Intelligence agency and has been sworn to the Official Secrets Act" - Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 2000
Operation Parakram in December 2001, exactly fifteen years on from Operation Brass Tacks, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war and only a US intervention saved the day. It was the second time in fifteen years when close to a million troops faced each other along an international border. The US intervention came about because the Sundarji doctrine took three weeks to implement, enough time for General Musharraf to seek US help and to make his famous "denouncing the Jihadis" speech.
A little known personality was brought back into India's decision making loop during the Kargil War, two years ago. He was inducted into the MEA as Officer on special Duty with undefined powers and functions. He was subsequently made advisor in the Ministry of External Affairs with the rank of a minister of state, with doubtful constitutional status. When questioned on his appointment in the Parliament, Jaswant Singh would go on to make that famous remark. With Defence Minister George Fernandes sidelined from the decision making process by Prime Minister Vajpayee, the freshly inducted man would go on to be at or near the helm of two of India's most sensitive exercises, operations post 1987. Bought back into the loop, to complete General Sundarji's legacy, was none other than Arun Singh, the recluse of Almora.
Rather than institutionalizing decision making we, again and again, personalize it. There in lies our greatest folly.
The Cold Start Doctrine and the civil-armed forces feud in the North Block
While I have been "asked" to shed more light on the diplomatic options that would be open to India once the Cold Start doctrine is implemented, I thought it prudent to first go deeper into the background of the cold start doctrine - from the military's standpoint. The first post on this issue perhaps did not come across as rounded, and that is not something I aim to rectify with this post. The national identity is going to be a long series, hence I will let the military have it's day out on the national identity.
submitted by throwawayindiangirl to india [link] [comments]

[np]"Pakistan's nuclear escalation ladder has only one rung" - Shireen Mazari,political scientist - related story

Arun Singh strode away into the mountains of Almora, the heartland of Kumaon. If it felt like a betrayal of his close friend Rajiv Gandhi, it was at least a decision taken with a heavy heart. Thrice, he had been persuaded by Prime Minister Gandhi to continue as Minister of State for defense, but with the weight of the Bofors scandal sagging shoulders in the Ministry of Defense, he thought it was best to go. He had wrenched himself away to an altogether different world, far removed from Delhi not just in distance but even more so in time, and he had no intention of returning.
The year was 1988. A year earlier he helped oversee an operation which brought a freshly nuclear armed Pakistan and India to the brink of war.
"Thence north to the glaciers" - Simla Agreement, 1972
The intervening years between 1974, when India displayed her nuclear might, and 1987 were largely peaceful, in the conventional sense. India and Pakistan didn't engage in open conflict, but as the arms race between the two neighbours heated up, so did the misadventures. In Operation Meghdoot in 1984, India wrestled control of the highest battlefield in the world, Siachen Glacier. With the Simla Agreement in 1972, failing to demarcate Indian and Pakistani territory, India for once, assumed a defensively-offensive posture to capture the area beyond point NJ9842, referred to as "thence north to the glaciers" in the Simla Agreement. As India had preempted Pakistan, India had the advantage of commanding the heights and used it to devastating effect to counter wave after wave of Pakistani attempts to gain a foothold on the glacier. More than thirty years on, India still controls the entire Siachen Glacier.
Perhaps buoyed by this daring manoeuvre, the Indian Army wasted little time in developing blueprints for future "preemptive" and "defensively-offensive" strikes. The Indian Government had, since Independence, assumed a purely defensive posture but under Chief of Army Staff General Sundarji, the military was at least ready to showcase its conventional might, as a sign of deterrence to Pakistan.
''This is not a third-world army, this is a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French." - A Western diplomat who attended the Operational manoeuvres, 1987
Moving on from the initial three phases of the Operation which involved consultations with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the first phase to sand modelling in the third, the Army entered Phase 4. It was the largest troop mobilization since World War II, larger than any NATO massing of troops. The operation involved moving 500,000-800,000 troops to the international border with Pakistan in East to West, South to West and North to West manoeuvres. The year was 1986 and the operation was codenamed Brass Tacks.
In fact, even though it was an internal exercise, this was India's first "Cold Start". General Sundarji was the Chief of Army Staff who lent his name to the Sundarji doctrine - involving three strike corps based in the hinterland (Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura), which having evaded first brush with the enemy (the corps closer to the border would take the first hits), would then strike Pakistan in a sledgehammer like motion. This doctrine would ultimately lead to India's failure in Operation Parakram exactly 15 years later.
Operation Brass Tacks was a Ministry of Defense operation/exercise, championed by General Sundarji and the Minister of State in the defense ministry Arun Singh, to simulate the operational capabilities of the Indian armed forces. This came on the back of India's Siachen Glacier mission and a long running Pakistani backed militancy in Punjab. This was, on the record at least, meant purely as an internal exercise to demonstrate the new armoured and light infantry capabilities of the Indian Army. The troop concentration was in the Indian state of Rajasthan and on the other side of the border lay the Pakistani province of Sindh.
Such a large troop movement would obviously not go unnoticed in Pakistan, and the Pakistani President and Chief of Army Staff, General Zia responded by moving three of his corps to the international border. Pakistan had misread the exercise as a declaration of war. He also activated the reserves and massed troops along the northern borders with India. Close to a million troops stood within firing range of each other, waiting for the shot across the bow. One bullet fired and one casualty, and all bets would have been off from the desert to the high mountains.
"Hoon is taking us to war" - Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Mani Shankar Aiyar, December 1986
The Prime Minister was his own Defense Minister at the time, so what is definitely clear is that he knew about Operation Brass Tacks. Where the water turns murky is when the operational manoeuvres began in Phase 4, in December 1986. Allegations by the Prime Minister's office say the Army pushed an internal exercise into a war mobilization, and Rajiv Gandhi, away on holiday, was unaware of it.
Scholarly evidence rests on the side of the Indian Army that Operation Brass Tacks was purely meant as an internal exercise. Whilst, the Indian Army wanted to display to Pakistan that the bleeding militancy in Punjab had not blunted India's conventional forces, the intention was never to incite war. Lieutenant General Hoon was the Western Army commander at the time, and was in charge of the entire operation. He, to this day, remains convinced that General Sundarji wanted to go to war with Pakistan and the operation was meant to incite a first strike from Pakistan. A hot line between the Military Operations Directorates of the two nations were never opened. For an exercise of this scale, it is often the first task accomplished and it is hard to term this an "oversight". Rajiv Gandhi has shades of a callow JFK, in that, his generals didn't directly disoby him or misinform him but were more than happy to create situations in which the nation would be forced to go to war. Shielding the Army was Rajiv Gandhi's closest friend, and fellow Doon School and Cambridge alumnus, Minister of State Arun Singh.
Rajiv Gandhi diffused the situation by inviting General Zia to lunch in Delhi, under the pretext of watching a cricket match. In February 1987, the two sides agreed to withdraw 150,000 troops from Kashmir. The retreat agreement for troops in the deserts of Rajasthan was reached in March 1987, but India continued the final manoeuvres, asserting that Pakistan had no reason to feel provoked. The final manoeuvres were overseen by foreign diplomats, including one Pakistani diplomat, in a rare Confidence Building Measure. Even though the situation mildly flared up again in late March 1987, when Pakistan's nuclear scientist AQ Khan said that Pakistan now had nuclear weapons, the worst was over. The two nations had pulled back from a war which, in all likelihood, would have involved battlefield nuclear weapons.
*"Pakistan's nuclear escalation ladder has only one rung" - Shireen Mazari, political scientist and central spokesperson of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf. *
This points back to the original question posed in Part I, where was the civil military coordination? Without any knowledge of what strategic goals we might have, the Indian general, even if successful in instigating a Pakistani first strike, would have been forced to retreat from Pakistani territory without anything more than tactical and operational victories. Also called, pyrrhic. India's difficulty has always been moving from a purely defensive mode to the defensively-offensive mode. The Indian armed forces have always known the need for this, but the civil leadership has never humoured the armed forces.
Operation Brass Tacks was a game of chess. The general, according to some more reports, hoped that Pakistan would view this exercise as an announcement of war, and true to form land the first strikes. This would give India justification for attacking Pakistan. It was envisioned that India would lay waste to Pakistan's retaliatory apparatus in multiple deep incursions into Pakistani territory, but more importantly destroy their nuclear facilities. A Pakistan, now split into two, would be forced to come to the negotiating table. Although it would have been viewed as an extremely hostile move by the world community, India could have potentially destroyed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. India would not have had to fight the Kashmir insurgency and the Kargil war under the shadow of a nuclear war, always careful to not take "that one step" which would give Pakistan justification for using nuclear weapons.
"He has been vetted by our Intelligence agency and has been sworn to the Official Secrets Act" - Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, 2000
Operation Parakram in December 2001, exactly fifteen years on from Operation Brass Tacks, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of nuclear war and only a US intervention saved the day. It was the second time in fifteen years when close to a million troops faced each other along an international border. The US intervention came about because the Sundarji doctrine took three weeks to implement, enough time for General Musharraf to seek US help and to make his famous "denouncing the Jihadis" speech.
A little known personality was brought back into India's decision making loop during the Kargil War, two years ago. He was inducted into the MEA as Officer on special Duty with undefined powers and functions. He was subsequently made advisor in the Ministry of External Affairs with the rank of a minister of state, with doubtful constitutional status. When questioned on his appointment in the Parliament, Jaswant Singh would go on to make that famous remark. With Defence Minister George Fernandes sidelined from the decision making process by Prime Minister Vajpayee, the freshly inducted man would go on to be at or near the helm of two of India's most sensitive exercises, operations post 1987. Bought back into the loop, to complete General Sundarji's legacy, was none other than Arun Singh, the recluse of Almora.
Rather than institutionalizing decision making we, again and again, personalize it. There in lies our greatest folly.
submitted by throwawayindiangirl2 to india [link] [comments]

Top 21 Best Bollywood Films Based on Cricket or Cricketers THE MATCH FIXING SAGA of 2000 - MOST INFAMOUS CRICKET SCANDAL Cricket in the dock as we expose betting scandal England Pakistan Test News Of The World Happy Birthday dada  Best captain of team india  A fan boy cut INDIA: CRICKET MATCH FIXING ALLEGATIONS: REPORT

Because of the 2013 Indian Premier League (IPL) sport fixing and betting scandal, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) has petitioned the government to legalize sports betting. The Public Gambling Act of 1867 prohibits the operation of a public gaming house or the visitation to such an establishment. John the bookmaker was an Indian bookie who 1994–95 received information regarding the weather and pitch by Australian cricketers Mark Waugh and Shane Warne in exchange for money. This was the greatest match-fixing scandal of the 1990s and as a matter of fact, the Australian Cricket Board initially was very eager to brush the case under carpet. Apparently, the reporter, who co-authored the original story a few weeks back that first put the allegations of betting and bribery in Indian cricket up front, had met former Pakistan wicketkeeper One was even more surprised by the statement made by the infamous bookie, Sanjeev Chawla, who after two years was brought back to India from England for investigation for the 2000 match fixing scandal said that "no cricket match is fairly played and that all cricket matches which people see are fixed". In an explosive betting and spot-fixing scandal in the sixth edition of the Indian Premier League (IPL) exposed by the Delhi police, several bookies with links to the underworld don Dawood Ibrahim and other foreign criminals as well as top cricketers of Rajasthan Royals franchise S Sreesanth, Ajit Chandila and Ankeet Chavan are set to be arrested by the Delhi police for spot-fixing, cheating

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Top 21 Best Bollywood Films Based on Cricket or Cricketers

If you want to learn how to Cheat in the Game of Cricket, then the best people to learn Cheating is from Indians. ... Indian Film Stars & india Cricketers Playing friendly Game Clip 2001 Very rare ... Ganguly is currently a part of the Supreme Court of India appointed Justice Mudgal Committee probe panel for the IPL Spot fixing and betting scandal's investigations.[16] Loading... This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queue In the first episode of the Double Century podcast (made into a vidcast for you on YouTube) we go back to the beginning of Test cricket. That beginning involved betting, jail and a journalist ... India-South Africa cricket betting scandal. The Story of 2009 Movie 'Kirkit' revolves around two squabbling groups are pitted against each other in cricket matches.