Abstract Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer overlay network to broadcast transactions and blocks. From the viewpoint of network measurement, we would like to observe this topology so we can characterize its performance, fairness and robustness. However, this is difficult because Bitcoin is deliberately designed to hide its topology from onlookers. Knowledge of the topology is not in itself a vulnerability, although it could conceivably help an attacker performing targeted eclipse attacks or to deanonymize transaction senders. In this paper we present TxProbe, a novel technique for reconstructing the Bitcoin network topology. TxProbe makes use of peculiarities in how Bitcoin processes out of order, or "orphaned" transactions. We conducted experiments on Bitcoin testnet that suggest our technique reconstructs topology with precision and recall surpassing 90%. We also used TxProbe to take a snapshot of the Bitcoin testnet in just a few hours. TxProbe may be useful for future measurement campaigns of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency networks. References
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Abstract Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. 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How crazy is this? (A protocol for metadata obfuscation)
Alice and Bob want to have a private conversation but they also don't want anyone to know they're talking to each other. I'm assuming that they can use some public key cryptography protocol that's sufficient to ensure their conversation is indeed private. Alice encrypts her messages using Bob's public key, and her encrypted messages can only be decrypted with Bob's private key. But what about the metadata, ie the who/what/when/where information that we now know is collected routinely by the NSA, and which allows an adversary to determine that Alice and Bob are in communication? As I understand it, there are several more or less practical ways to obscure the metadata -- including the identity of the intended recipient -- of Alice's and Bob's messages. These methods include steganography, TOpluggable transports, anonymizing email services and metadata encryption. But all of these approaches have weaknesses (eg trust issues, the existence of a central point of attack, susceptibility to traffic analysis), and as long as Alice's messages are ultimately being delivered to Bob (and vice versa), then any adversary who could discover this would know that Alice and Bob were in communication. But what if Alice sent her encrypted messages not only to Bob, but to everyone ( * )? And everyone received them ( ** )? Public key encryption would ensure that only Bob would be able to actually decrypt and read the message, and meanwhile even an adversary with complete access to the entire network between Alice's and Bob's machines would still be unable to determine which particular instance of 'everyone' was the intended recipient. In other words, from the outside, an adversary would not be able to determine who Alice was talking to. ( * ) 'Everyone' here means 'everyone who's participating in this protocol'. Obviously, as with TOR, the more participants the better. This protocol would be trivially useless with only two users. But even three users would provide some protection. (Is Alice talking to Bob or to Carol?) And it would work a whole lot better if Bob were literally one in a million. ( ** ) Or rather: everyone's machine/device automatically received them. Each machine/device would then attempt to decrypt all incoming messages, and non-decipherable messages would automatically be discarded(***). The user would only be notified if the message was in fact for them. (***) Or, more efficiently, be forwarded to a swarm of peers in a process that would be analogous to seeding a torrent. If widely adopted, a protocol like this would presumably generate an insane amount of network traffic. Perhaps it might place an impossible, exponentially growing burden on the internet's infrastructure? I dunno. I also don't know if this could be mitigated by having each message be 'broadcast' using a P2P-like protocol? In any case, it's also going to be very resource intensive for every participating machine/device -- but then again, doesn't everyone who isn't mining bitcoins usually have countless unused CPU cycles on their machines? Speaking of massive waste... you could also use this protocol to conceal the identity of the sender if everyone's device was set to automatically generate and send out a continual stream of dummy encrypted messages. And again, perhaps the absolute number of dummy messages could somehow be managed by recycling discarded messages back out into the swarm. (Even if this is possible, I think this kind of recycling would have to be done carefully, but I don't want to get into the details here.) So what do you guys think? Is it so crazy it just might work? Or just plain crazy? Am I mischaracterizing the problem or the solution or missing some really obvious flaw?
Abstract As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately. 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Bitcoin is a popular alternative to fiat money, widely used for its perceived anonymity properties. However, recent attacks on Bitcoin's peer-to-peer (P2P) network demonstrated that its gossip-based flooding protocols, which are used to ensure global network consistency, may enable user deanonymization---the linkage of a user's IP address with her pseudonym in the Bitcoin network. An Analysis of Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Tra c Philip Koshy, Diana Koshy, and Patrick McDaniel Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA Abstract. Over the last 4 years, Bitcoin, a decentralized P2P crypto-currency, has gained widespread attention. The ability to create pseudo- Bitcoin has attracted considerable attention from governments, banks, as well as researchers. However, Bitcoin is not a completely anonymous system. All transaction information in the Bitcoin system is published on the network and can be used to reveal the identity of the user by transaction correlation analysis. In this paper, a secure and privacy-preserving mix service for Bitcoin anonymity Download Citation | An Analysis of Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic | Over the last 4 years, Bitcoin, a decentralized P2P crypto-currency, has gained widespread attention. The An Analysis of Anonymity in Bitcoin Using P2P Network Traffic. Although previous work has analyzed the degree of anonymity Bitcoin offers using clustering and flow analysis, none have
Полная АНОНИМНОСТЬ в сети. ПРОСТОЙ МАЙНИНГ КРИПТОВАЛЮТЫ. Utopia P2P - экосистема 2020 года — KutuzoV
Transactions in bitcoin form a publicly accessible network of economic relations, which can be extracted from the transaction history available to all users in the P2P-network of bitcoin. Using re ... Video taken during the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2017, held February 26 through March 1, 2017, at Catamaran Resort Hotel & Spa in San Diego, California. P2P Mixing ... Anonymity is another important area of weakness for Bitcoin with node traffic being sent in an unencrypted fashion. Not only is it unsecure to involuntarily disclose the public IP address of your ... Riposte is the first such system, to our knowledge, that simultaneously protects against traffic-analysis attacks, prevents anonymous denial-of-service by malicious clients, and scales to million ... Anonymity in the Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network by Giulia Fanti ... 48:29. 3.6 P2P Systems-Failures in Chord 14:53 - Duration: 14 ... Is Program Analysis the Silver Bullet Against Software ...