SEC Comment about "Affiliate" Stockholder in Public Float

The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institutional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
submitted by fortniteBot3000 to Sino [link] [comments]

The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institutional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
submitted by fortniteBot3000 to communism [link] [comments]

S.929: National Labor Relations Act of 2020 Vote

H.R.XXX: National Labor Relations Act of 2020
Whereas, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 prohibited many forms of strikes, boycotts, or pickets necessary for workers to have leverage during collective bargaining and allowed for states to outlaw union security.
Whereas, the Human Rights Watch has found that the rights of American workers are being violated and abused through retaliatory action for organizing unions.
Whereas, the purpose of unions is to ensure that ordinary working Americans are able to receive a fair return to their work and not be subject to wage theft, which is made possible by surplus value.
Whereas, numerous attempts to repeal the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, including the recent Employee Free Choice Act, were blocked despite major public campaigns.
Whereas, the Supreme Court case D. Louis Abood v. Detroit Board of Education found that labor unions may charge all employees of the employer with whom they bargain fees in order to fund such “collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the “National Labor Relations Act of 2020.”
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
29 U.S. Code § 152, paragraph 2 is amended to read as follows—
(2) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, directly or indirectly, (2) the United States and any agency or instrumentality of the United States, and (3) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency [includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,] but shall not include [the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or] any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
SECTION 3. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
29 U.S. Code § 153, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the “Board”) [created by this subchapter prior to its amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C. 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States, except that the Board] shall consist of [five instead of three] seven members, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve [. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for] terms of [five] seven years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
SECTION 4. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 157 is amended to read as follows—
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title].
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 158, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to [encourage or] discourage membership in any labor organization or to discourage support of or participation in a strike. Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later. [(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;]
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(c) 29 U.S. Code § 158 is amended by repealing subsections (b) through (f) in their entirety.
(d) 29 U.S. Code § 163 is amended to read as follows—
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike[, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right].
SECTION 5. UNION REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS
29 U.S. Code § 159 is amended to read as follows—
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer [and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment].
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. [Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer’s premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.]
(c)
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board—
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a), or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection (a)[; or],* the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.*
(B) [by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a);] by a majority of employees, the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a majority of the employees have designated the labor individual or labor organization as their representative, the Board shall certify the individual or labor organization as the representative of the unit of employees.
[the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.]
(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 160(c) of this title.
(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.
SECTION 6. PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 160, subsections (b), (c), (e), (j) and (l) are amended to read as follows—
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint. [Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge.] Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28.
(c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with [or without] back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter: [Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope.] Such order may further require such a person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. If the Board deems that an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices against an employee, the Board is to provide back pay and additional damages equal to or greater than two times the back pay to the employee. [No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case may be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order of the Board and become effective as therein prescribed.]
(e) Any person who fails to comply with an order made by the Board within ten days must pay back pay to the employees affected by their unfair labor practice, as determined by the Board, as well as a $10,000 civil fine directly to the Board. The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order, [and~~] for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, for the back pay and fines that are owed, and shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.
(j) The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any [person] employer has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
(l) Whenever it is charged that any [person] employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) of this title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining order under section 158(b)(7) of this title if a charge against the employer under section 158(a)(2) of this title has been filed and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(D) of this title.
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 162, is amended to read as follows—
(a) Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this subchapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(b) Any employer who commits an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both or, if another unfair labor practice has been committed in the last five years by the employer, a fine of not more than $200,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Any person who incurs physical or monetary harm by reason of an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title may, after thirty days following filing such practices with the Board, bring a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction and, if such court deems that the unfair labor practice did occur, is entitled to back pay without reduction, consequential damages, punitive damages based upon the severity of the violation, the impact of the violation, and the income of the employer, attorney’s fees, and any other relief deemed necessary by the court.
SECTION 7. SEVERABILITY
(a) If any provision of this act shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the act shall remain in full force and effect.
SECTION 8. ENACTMENT
(a) This act shall take effect ninety days following its successful passage.
(b) This act shall take precedence over all other pieces of legislation that might contradict it.
This act is written and sponsored by Sen. darthholo (S-AC) and is cosponsored by Rep. Duce_de_Zoop (S-US), Rep. PGF3 (S-AC-2), Rep. pik_09 (S-US), Rep. brihimia (S-DX-2), Rep. KellinQuinn__ (D-AC-3), Sen. Tucklet1911 (S-CH).
The Act, which has not been amended by this Chamber, is read above in its current form.
You will now vote on the Act, using the (Yea/Abstain/Nay) votes, in the comments below.
This thread will close at 3:15 PM EST Tuesday.
submitted by Kingthero to ModelUSSenate [link] [comments]

The Dominance of Public Ownership in the Chinese Socialist Market Economy

There are many that seem to believe that China today is a capitalist country, and that ever since 1978, China took the capitalist road. The relative decline of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China in comparison to the private sector is used as damning evidence in favor of this view.
I will take this article for example:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/why-chinas-state-owned-companies-still-have-a-key-role-to-play/
China’s private sector - which has been revving up since the global financial crisis - is now serving as the main driver of China’s economic growth. The combination of numbers 60/70/80/90 are frequently used to describe the private sector's contribution to the Chinese economy: they contribute 60% of China’s GDP, and are responsible for 70% of innovation, 80% of urban employment and provide 90% of new jobs. Private wealth is also responsible for 70% of investment and 90% of exports.
All of this is seemingly supported by official Chinese data AT FIRST GLANCE.
Taking a closer look, there may be problems in this combination of numbers. While China’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since reform began, claims that the private sector now dominates the economy may be exaggerated.
This comes from a misunderstanding of the use of the terms "state" and "nonstate" in Chinese official statistics.
https://www.heritage.org/testimony/chinese-state-owned-enterprises-and-us-china-economic-relations
The discussion of SOEs has been undermined by a fundamental error: the conflation of restructured, share-holding firms with the truly private sector. Share-holding SOEs are manifestly not private actors and assessments of the corporate sector that assume so are fatally flawed from the outset. The origin of this mistake is historical. As quasi-state entities emerged and proliferated, it was clear some sort of separate treatment was necessary and the concept of “non-state” was created. This was never intended to indicate “private”—quite the opposite: it was meant to signify that the creation of corporate forms quite different from SOEs could occur without privatization and its ideological pitfalls.
The meaning of “non-state” is very well understood by the Chinese government. The (sometimes willful) misunderstanding outside China rests on two shaky pillars. The first is a mis-rendering of “non-state”—where the PRC sees the opposite of state as non-state, many foreign observers see the opposite of state as “private” and simply re-label accordingly. The second is more sophisticated and based on the share-holding change.
Neither specification of share-holders nor sale of stock by itself does anything to alter state control. The large majority of firms listed on domestic stock markets are specifically designated as state-owned. The sale of small minority stakes on foreign exchanges could be construed as recasting mainstays such as CNPC (through its list vehicle PetroChina), China Mobile, and Chinalco as non-state entities of some form. However, they are still centrally directed SOEs, as explicitly indicated by the Chinese government.
Derek Scissors’s claim (the author of the article I am quoting) also has the support of empirical evidence as well.
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-chinese-stocks-are-a-state-controlled-facade-2010-6
Even after the enactment of the non-tradable share reform in 2005, the free- float ratio of China A shares remains the lowest in Asia (Exhibit 27).
The State-owned Asset and Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) is the government entity charged with holding and administering the large state-owned positions. These shares were classified as non-tradable until 2005, when the non-tradable share reform gave share dividends to free-float shareholders in exchange for making the government-held shares tradable (but with certain constraints). Over time, we believe that the SASAC will continue to sell down these holdings on the margin, while keeping the bulk of the shares.
Thus the control and ownership that U.S. share ownership represents is completely different than what Chinese share ownership represents. Simply put, Chinese shares don't translate into effective ownership of their underlying companies.
https://books.google.com/books/about/Capitalism_with_Chinese_Characteristics.html?id=YBpih2Q1X9kC&source=kp_book_description
The OECD economists assign the entire output by legal-person shareholding firms to the private sector. Is this a reasonable approach? Getting this question right is critical. In 1998, legal-person shareholding firms accountedfor 40 percent (11.3/28.9) of the purported private sector. Excluding these firms would reduce the share of the private sector in industrial value-addedfrom 28.9 percent in 1998 to only 17.6 percent (i.e., 28.9 percent minus 11.3 percent). For 2005, the private sector exclusive of legal-person shareholding firms would be 39.8 percent rather than 71.2 percent (i.e., 71.2 percent minus 31.4 percent). This is another illustration of a common refrain in this book – getting the details right matters.
Legal-person shareholding refers to cross-shareholding by firms. Probably because of the connotations of this term, the OECD economists might have assumed that legal-person shareholding implies that China has a keiretsu arrangement similar to that in Japan where firms own each others’ stocks. The difference with Japan, however, is that in China much of the legal-person share capital originates in the state sector, via SOEs establishing or holding significant equity stakes in other firms. These firms then become affiliates or subsidiaries of the SOEs. The subsidiaries of the SOEs, on account of their final ownership, are still SOEs.

Another well-known SOE on the list classified by the OECD study as private is SAIC Motor Corporation Limited (SAIC Motor). In the NBS dataset, the state share of SAIC Motor’s share capital structure is 0 percent; it is 70 percent legal-person shareholding and 30 percent individual shareholding. So this firm qualifies as a private firm in the OECD definition. But SAIC Motor is not even remotely a private firm. SAIC Motor was established in 1997; its predecessor was Shanghai Gear Factory. In 1997, 30 percent of the share capital was issued on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the rest of the share capital was held by Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which is 100 percent owned by the Shanghai government. Because the Shanghai government owns SAIC Motor via SAIC – a legal-person shareholder – the state share capital is reduced to zero; however, from a control perspective, there is little question about who controls this firm.
The example of SAIC Motor also illustrates the nature of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. Much of the reform effort had nothing to do with actually changing the owners of the firms but rather it was directed at securitizing the full but previously implicit equity holdings of the state in the SOEs. Although these reform measures copy the superficial forms of a capitalistic market economy, none of them has anything to do with its essence – transferring corporate control from government to private investors.
The high concentration of the ownership structure of the legal-person shareholding firms is another sign that these firms are not private at all. In the NBS dataset, SAIC Motor has the most dispersed shareholding structure among the legal-person shareholding firms because 30 percent of its shares are held by individual shareholders. (This is because the firm is listed.) In contrast, of 16,871 legal-person shareholding firms in the NBS dataset for 1998, 75 percent have zero individual share capital. The average individual share capital is only 3.7 percent. This is entirely expected given the heavily accounting nature of the SOE reforms. As evidence, 7,612 of these so-called legal-person shareholding firms are actually factories – they are simply production subsidiaries of other SOEs. This explains the extraordinary concentration of ownership and control of these firms.

A view focusing on the control-right problems of the SOEs ought to have led to the next logical step of contract reforms – management buyouts of the SOEs. But, in the early 1990s, the Chinese leaders reversed the policy on the grounds that the contract reforms did not work. Instead, they embraced an industrial policy approach that actually augmented the control rights of those SOEs that the government had decided to retain. In the 1980s, collective TVEs, such as Kelon, had state revenue rights but private control rights. In the 1990s, in the case of the large SOEs, the situation was completely reversed. Most of the large SOEs, which were listed on China’s two stock exchanges, had partial private revenue rights but complete state control rights.
Between 1990 and 2003, only 6.97 percent of the initial public offerings on the two Chinese stock exchanges were from private-sector companies. The rest were SOEs that issued minority shares but in which managerial control remained very clearly in state hands.27 Put differently, because many shareholding firms in China have private revenue rights but their control rights still rest with the government, they should be considered as state-controlled. According to a detailed study of more than 600 firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders – state, legal persons, and individual shareholders – each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares (Xu and Wang 1997). This stock split has remained more or less constant since then, although the government has plans to reduce the state shares. The control rights of these firms were overwhelmingly state. According to the same study, although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, on average individual shareholders occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on the boards of 154 companies, whereas on average the state was over-represented on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted to 30 percent. There were no proxy voting procedures, thereby putting the individual shareholders in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis the institu- ` tional investors such as the government agencies. This usurpation of rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its control rights even over those firms that have explicitly private revenue rights.
What does this mean? The mixed ownership corporate enterprises that emerged in China in recent decades are still to a large extent controlled by the state and should be considered to be a part of the public sector. This has considerable implications for what is being discussed at hand. In Chinese statistics, the nonstate sector includes these mixed ownership firms. Thus by making the huge mistake of conflating "nonstate" with "private," analysts mistakenly place mixed ownership firms into the private sector. However, this can be corrected and we come up with the following conclusion instead.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/17/chinas-soe-sector-is-bigger-than-some-would-have-us-think/
The results of forcing such a choice are illustrative. With non-wholly state-funded LLCs included, the public share of fixed investment in the first quarter of 2016 is near 60 per cent. Data from 2013 show the public sector still accounting for only 30 per cent of total firms but roughly 55 per cent of assets, 45 per cent of revenue and 40 per cent of profits.

Those who claim private leadership can say that non-wholly state-funded LLCs are not the same as SOEs. The stronger point is that even some pure SOEs are qualitatively different than they were 20 years ago. But it is a large and mistaken jump from these correct observations to treating mixed or ‘non-state’ as equivalent to private, which Xinhua and many other observers frequently do. The non-traditional-SOE sector may account for 60 per cent of GDP; the private sector does not.
These numbers show that the public sector still maintains its dominance in its contribution GDP and investment.
However, the question still lingers whether contributions to GDP, investment, revenue, etc are accurate in making deductions about the ownership structures in an economy. Chinese economists propose that assets are the most important indicator to evaluate the status of any form of ownership, especially public ownership, in the national economy.
There is strong theoretical reasoning to prove this as well.
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-13-6895-0
Actually, to rely on assets to evaluate the dominant status of public ownership does not only meet the requirement of government policies, but is also deeply rooted in economic theories as well. Classical Marxian economists usually referred to the concept of “property right” when talking about ownership, i.e., the ownership of material production. For example, Marx, when making discussions on the basic features of the new, future society, spoke of the society as “collectively-owned, based on common ownership of the means of production”. Such a concept of ownership of the means of material production had been long in use, which was associated with the social background before the 1950s when various non-material means of production (such as various intangible assets, trademarks, marketing network, computer software and science and technologies) had not been common or important in social production. With technological advances and changes in the means of capitalist production, the various non-material modes became more and more important in the establishment of the capitalist relation of production. Therefore, the denotation and connotations of ownership became richer and richer. For example, some international enterprises originating in developed countries now make use of their advantages in product brands and supply chains to organize international production with little or no reliance on the share of capital investment in their hands; nor do they have to build any facility physically for material production. As a matter of fact, Marx seemed to have foreseen this as he sometimes talked about ownership with vague denotation and used such poorly-defined terms as “external conditions of labor”: “Any way to distribute consumer materials is just the distribution of the productive condition itself… Since the factors of production have to be distributed this way, the distribution of consumer materials has to go this way, too.” Here he did not mention the concept of means of production, but “productive condition” and “factors of production” that had an even wider range of connotations.
Using assets to evaluate the position of public ownership in the Chinese economy, we come to the conclusion that public ownership maintains its dominance.
Public ownership as the dominant form is supported by data. By the end of 2012, the total amount of the operating assets of China’s thrice industries was 487.53 trillion yuan (including the assets of individually-owned businesses), among which 53%, or 258.39 trillion yuan, was owned by the public sector. These data showed that, even with the strictest measurement, public ownership was still the dominant form of the national economy in China, and from the perspective of the ownership structure, the socialist nature of the Chinese society did not change; nor did the reforms change the color of the society. As a matter of fact, the socialist nature of our country also decides that the size of the nonoperating assets of the public sector is also considerable. When the nonoperating assets were included, the total amount of the assets of the Chinese society would be 518.13 trillion yuan (excluding the noncultivated undeveloped resource assets), among which the public owned 288.99 trillion yuan, or 55.78%. The national asset and its size are the externalized cost for efficiency improvement in the operational fields, in which the efficiency of enterprises relies heavily on such social support. Therefore, inspection on the ownership structure of the economy cannot ignore the nonoperating assets.
Now the question is, does this conclusion about the year 2012 apply currently to the year 2020? The answer is a yes.
In terms of the long-term trend, the dominant status of China’s public ownership is guaranteed. First, starting from 2009, the reforms on the ownership structure in China took a turn from rapid changes to fine adjustments. In the first phase (2004–2008), the proportion of public ownership, measured by asset, in the secondary and tertiary industries decreased from 62.73 to 55.48%, while the proportion of the nonpublic ownership increased from 37.27 to 44.52%. In the second phase (2009–2012), however, the proportion of public ownership decreased from 54.32 to 50.44%, and that of the nonpublic, from 45.68 to 49.56%. The numbers showed that the reforms on the ownership structure in China had progressed from wide-range and large-scale changes to a stable phase of fine adjustments. The assets of the public and nonpublic sectors have drawn to stabilization, which suggests that the dominating status of the public sector, measured by asset, will not change in the long-term trend, and the economic system that is based on the dominance of public ownership has been stabilized. Second, the strategic reorganization of SOEs and the public investment used in the state macro-adjustments will continue to accumulate new assets for the publicly-owned economy, which ensures the growth in quantity of both the publicly- and the non-publicly-owned economies. With public ownership as the dominant form, as long as the publicly-owned assets do not increase at a much slower speed than the non-publicly-owned, there is no question for public ownership to remain dominant.
If one needs more quantitative evidence to prove that ownership structure has been stable recently, one need not look further than the Chinese statistical yearbooks, which provide us continuous data on publicly owned assets (but note that this data only is on the industrial sector and leaves out the primary and tertiary sectors).
I made a spreadsheet here which has data from the Chinese statistical yearbooks on the ratio of state owned assets to total assets over time (from 2004 to 2018).
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1eUUMr_sUJxo8ZCRwodsXAQVtjVgv4Vity2ACpe01cCA/edit?usp=sharing
The data obviously shows that, just as the authors of the book predicted, the ownership adjustments in the Chinese economy have been very small and have largely stabilized with no further retreat of the public sector occuring. Thus we can still conclude that the public sector still maintains its dominance in China.
The Chinese statistical yearbooks can be found here:
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/
What I find interesting however is that the authors in the book I quoted from earlier come to the conclusion that the public sector makes up only 35% of output and 25% of employment in the secondary and tertiary industries, which may run counter to Derek Scissors’s claims about the larger contribution of the public sector in GDP, investment, etc. Whatever the case, the point still stands that by using assets as the main indicator, the Chinese public sector still maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy.
How does the position of the Chinese public sector compare to the capitalist countries?
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
First, the publicly-owned assets in China have a higher share. In the secondary and tertiary industries only in 2012, the publicly-owned economic assets reached 226 trillion yuan in China and, according to the study on China’s sovereign assets and liabilities by Li Yang, et al.,10 the non-operating assets (excluding state land resources) reached 30.7 trillion yuan in 2010. The two together accounted for 53.62% of the total assets of the secondary and tertiary industries. In contrast, in the national balance sheet of the U.K., the share of the public sectors is as low as negligible: before the global financial crisis, the net assets of the U.K.’s public departments accounted for 6% of its total assets while in 2010, the percentage was 0 (Appendix Table 24). Similarly, the U.S. owned a total of 2.7 trillion dollar assets according to the national balance sheet of 2011 published by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Appendix Table 25) while the total assets owned by the U.S. residents and non-profit organizations reached 71 trillion dollars at the same times, giving the government assets a share of only 3.7% (Appendix Table 26). Canada has the same story in that its public sectors owned 2.4% of the total assets of its national economy in 2008 (Appendix Table 27). Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, was once considered to have one of the largest shares of SOEs, but the total assets of its state departments plunged in share, from 1.9% in 2007 to 0.1% in 2011 (Appendix Table 28), and all of its SOEs had a collective amount of assets that did not exceed 100 billion euro.11 Even when we took a round number of 100 billion, the total stateowned assets in Germany was still less than 1.3 trillion euro. The story is somewhat different for the catching-up countries such as Japan and South Korea in that they have relatively higher shares of publicly-owned assets. In Japan, for example, the total assets of public departments had a rapid decrease in share from 8.6% in 2007 to 2.6% in 2011 after the global financial crisis. Meanwhile, South Korea has always managed a high share of publicly-owned assets, which was 18.6% in 2011 (Appendix Table 29). Evidently, we have a much higher share of publicly-owned assets in China compared to capitalist countries, especially when compared to the public departments of the developed capitalist countries.
Even compared to the supposedly "mixed" or "state capitalist" economies of East Asia, publicly owned assets in China are a much larger share of the total than are present in Japan or South Korea, thus affirming the socialist (rather than “state capitalist”) nature of the Chinese economy.
One final question remains however: where is the Chinese economy headed in the next few decades?
The answer can be found in mixed ownership reform. Today, Chinese firms are reorganizing into mixed ownership firms where public sector and private sector firms are intermeshed and the divisions between them are blurred. One thing to note however is that the state will still maintain its dominance in these mixed ownership firms. This can be seen in the asset composition of mixed ownership firms.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02529203.2014.999905
In the absence of precise data on the different ownership components of corporate enterprises, we can only disaggregate their public and non-public components internally. The data from Yang Xinming and Yang Xuechun’s measurement of the total assets of the mixed ownership economy in 2008 indicate that the public and the private component account for 65 and 35 percent of the total respectively. After calculating the paid-in capital structure from the 2004 census data, we find that the public and private components accounted for 63 and 37 percent of the total respectively, as shown in Table 8. We therefore estimate the proportion of public assets in the total mixed ownership economy to have been 63 percent in 2004-2007 and 65 percent in 2008 and beyond.

Secondly, as indicated in Table 7, the assets of the mixed ownership economy represented by corporate enterprises have been growing extremely fast and are the largest in terms of scale. In 2012, this sector’s assets accounted for 51.8 percent of total productive assets in secondary and tertiary industry, ahead of all other types of enterprises; moreover, the sector is one in which the state-owned economic component is dominant. These data and this analysis offer an empirical basis for the arrangements for deepening reform set out in the Decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CCCPC, which notes that the mixed economy is an important means of realizing the basic economic system and is conducive to amplifying the role of state-owned capital and strengthening the dynamism, control and influence of the state-owned economy.
What the Chinese leadership seeks now is the mutual development of both the public and private sectors in mixed ownership enterprises instead of one sector developing at the expense of the other.
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943
Public ownership that dominates the asset structure is very tolerant of the non-publicly-owned economy. The dominating status of the publicly-owned assets provides material support for and is fundamental to China’s socialist ownership, underlies realization of common prosperity, offers a carrier for social functions to operate and, at the same time, strongly propels the development of the non-publicly-owned economy. In fact, the dominating status of the non-publicly-owned economy in output, employment, and taxation is the premise of its existence and development. According to our estimation, among the secondary and tertiary industries in China in 2012, the proportions of added value of the non-publicly- and publicly-owned economies were 67.59 and 32.41%, respectively, and new employment, 75.20 and 24.80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the businesses in the primary industry, such as agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery, are mostly comprised of family-based ones. Such development of both publicly- and non-publicly-owned economies with their respective status in asset size not matching their corresponding contributions is determined by their distinctive distributions across economic areas, and it also meets the demand of efficiency by the dominating market and by the external economics. Therefore, the domination in asset size by the publicly-owned economy together with the dominating contributions to output and employment made by the non-publicly-owned economy must stand side by side and march forward together. This is the foundation in practice for the “two unswervinglies” policy
In addition:
In addition, with further adjustments of the ownership structure, the dislocation of the domination in asset size of the public sector and the domination in economic contributions of the nonpublic sector will only be furthered. Actually, only with its rapid development can the nonpublic sector fulfill its role as an indispensable part to the socialist market economy, which will further drive SOEs to improve their efficiency so that mutual development will be achieved; and only with complete fusion of the two sectors brought by further improvement of the production efficiency and socialization of them can the primary stage of socialism has a chance to march to a higher stage.
In other words, the current mixed ownership reforms are setting up a huge building block for socialist China to step into a higher stage of socialism, bringing it closer to communism. So when you see articles like these from CGTN, please do not worry! Opening the “commanding heights” of the economy to private/foreign investment and competition is only a measure to further mixed ownership reforms and will not challenge the dominance of public ownership in the Chinese economy.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-18/China-unveils-guideline-on-improving-the-socialist-market-economy-QB6Vn3GVbO/index.html
There is a lot more Marxist theoretical backing for mixed ownership reform, but considering the size of this post, the theory behind the mixed ownership reforms will probably have to be something to write for another post.
Anyway, I’ll still leave behind some readings that will be useful to understand the combination of the public sector and market and the intermeshment of the public and private sectors in the Chinese economy to those who are curious.
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/chapter-4-chinas-socialist-market-economy-pre-publication.pdf
https://stalinsmoustache.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/not-some-other-ism-06-pre-publication.pdf
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811327261 (chapter 1)
https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9789811368943 (start at page 183)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-10-2018-011/full/html
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/CPE-04-2019-0006/full/html
https://philpapers.org/rec/BOEISA-2
I also HIGHLY RECOMMEND reading the articles in the following two journals (using scihub to get past the paywalls):
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rssc20
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rict20
submitted by fortniteBot3000 to InformedTankie [link] [comments]

S. 929: National Labor Relations Act of 2020 - Floor Amendments

"Mr. Speaker, I propose the following amendment to the legislation up for debate."
"The Representative shall read the amendment to be placed for vote immediately following its proposal."
H.R.XXX: National Labor Relations Act of 2020
Whereas, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 prohibited many forms of strikes, boycotts, or pickets necessary for workers to have leverage during collective bargaining and allowed for states to outlaw union security.
Whereas, the Human Rights Watch has found that the rights of American workers are being violated and abused through retaliatory action for organizing unions.
Whereas, the purpose of unions is to ensure that ordinary working Americans are able to receive a fair return to their work and not be subject to wage theft, which is made possible by surplus value. Whereas, numerous attempts to repeal the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, including the recent Employee Free Choice Act, were blocked despite major public campaigns.
Whereas, the Supreme Court case D. Louis Abood v. Detroit Board of Education found that labor unions may charge all employees of the employer with whom they bargain fees in order to fund such “collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the “National Labor Relations Act of 2020.”
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
29 U.S. Code § 152, paragraph 2 is amended to read as follows—
(2) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, directly or indirectly, (2) the United States and any agency or instrumentality of the United States, and (3) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency [includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,] but shall not include [the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or] any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
SECTION 3. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
29 U.S. Code § 153, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the “Board”) [created by this subchapter prior to its amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C. 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States, except that the Board] shall consist of [five instead of three] seven members, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve [. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for] terms of [five] seven years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
SECTION 4. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 157 is amended to read as follows—
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title].
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 158, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to [encourage or] discourage membership in any labor organization or to discourage support of or participation in a strike. Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later. [(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;]
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(c) 29 U.S. Code § 158 is amended by repealing subsections (b) through (f) in their entirety.
(d) 29 U.S. Code § 163 is amended to read as follows—
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike[, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right].
SECTION 5. UNION REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS
29 U.S. Code § 159 is amended to read as follows—
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer [and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment].
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. [Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer’s premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.]
(c)
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board—
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a), or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection
(a)[; or],* the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.*
(B) [by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a);] by a majority of employees, the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a majority of the employees have designated the labor individual or labor organization as their representative, the Board shall certify the individual or labor organization as the representative of the unit of employees.
[the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.]
(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 160(c) of this title.
(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.
SECTION 6. PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 160, subsections (b), (c), (e), (j) and (l) are amended to read as follows—
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint. [Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge.] Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28.
(c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with [or without] back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter: [Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope.] Such order may further require such a person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. If the Board deems that an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices against an employee, the Board is to provide back pay and additional damages equal to or greater than two times the back pay to the employee. [No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case may be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order of the Board and become effective as therein prescribed.]
(e) Any person who fails to comply with an order made by the Board within ten days must pay back pay to the employees affected by their unfair labor practice, as determined by the Board, as well as a $10,000 civil fine directly to the Board. The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order, [and~~] for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, for the back pay and fines that are owed, and shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.
(j) The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any [person] employer has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
(l) Whenever it is charged that any [person] employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) of this title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining order under section 158(b)(7) of this title if a charge against the employer under section 158(a)(2) of this title has been filed and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(D) of this title.
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 162, is amended to read as follows—
(a) Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this subchapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(b) Any employer who commits an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both or, if another unfair labor practice has been committed in the last five years by the employer, a fine of not more than $200,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Any person who incurs physical or monetary harm by reason of an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title may, after thirty days following filing such practices with the Board, bring a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction and, if such court deems that the unfair labor practice did occur, is entitled to back pay without reduction, consequential damages, punitive damages based upon the severity of the violation, the impact of the violation, and the income of the employer, attorney’s fees, and any other relief deemed necessary by the court.
SECTION 7. SEVERABILITY
(a) If any provision of this act shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the act shall remain in full force and effect.
SECTION 8. ENACTMENT
(a) This act shall take effect ninety days following its successful passage.
(b) This act shall take precedence over all other pieces of legislation that might contradict it.
This act is written and sponsored by Sen. darthholo (S-AC) and is cosponsored by Rep. Duce_de_Zoop (S-US), Rep. PGF3 (S-AC-2), Rep. pik_09 (S-US), Rep. brihimia (S-DX-2), Rep. KellinQuinn__ (D-AC-3), Sen. Tucklet1911 (S-CH).
submitted by srajar4084 to ModelUSHouse [link] [comments]

S.929: National Labor Relations Act of 2020 Vote

H.R.XXX: National Labor Relations Act of 2020
Whereas, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 prohibited many forms of strikes, boycotts, or pickets necessary for workers to have leverage during collective bargaining and allowed for states to outlaw union security.
Whereas, the Human Rights Watch has found that the rights of American workers are being violated and abused through retaliatory action for organizing unions.
Whereas, the purpose of unions is to ensure that ordinary working Americans are able to receive a fair return to their work and not be subject to wage theft, which is made possible by surplus value.
Whereas, numerous attempts to repeal the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, including the recent Employee Free Choice Act, were blocked despite major public campaigns.
Whereas, the Supreme Court case D. Louis Abood v. Detroit Board of Education found that labor unions may charge all employees of the employer with whom they bargain fees in order to fund such “collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the “National Labor Relations Act of 2020.”
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
29 U.S. Code § 152, paragraph 2 is amended to read as follows—
(2) The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person, directly or indirectly, (2) the United States and any agency or instrumentality of the United States, and (3) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency [includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly,] but shall not include [the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or] any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
SECTION 3. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
29 U.S. Code § 153, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the “Board”) [created by this subchapter prior to its amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C. 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States, except that the Board] shall consist of [five instead of three] seven members, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve [. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for] terms of [five] seven years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
SECTION 4. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 157 is amended to read as follows—
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title].
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 158, subsection (a) is amended to read as follows—
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to [encourage or] discourage membership in any labor organization or to discourage support of or participation in a strike. Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later. [(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;]
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
(c) 29 U.S. Code § 158 is amended by repealing subsections (b) through (f) in their entirety.
(d) 29 U.S. Code § 163 is amended to read as follows—
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike[, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right].
SECTION 5. UNION REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS
29 U.S. Code § 159 is amended to read as follows—
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer [and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment].
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof. [Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer’s premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.]
(c)
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board—
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a), or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection (a)[; or],* the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.*
(B) [by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a);] by a majority of employees, the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a majority of the employees have designated the labor individual or labor organization as their representative, the Board shall certify the individual or labor organization as the representative of the unit of employees.
[the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.]
(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 160(c) of this title.
(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.
SECTION 6. PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT
(a) 29 U.S. Code § 160, subsections (b), (c), (e), (j) and (l) are amended to read as follows—
(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint. [Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge.] Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28.
(c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with [or without] back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter: [Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope.] Such order may further require such a person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. If the Board deems that an employer has engaged in unfair labor practices against an employee, the Board is to provide back pay and additional damages equal to or greater than two times the back pay to the employee. [No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case may be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order of the Board and become effective as therein prescribed.]
(e) Any person who fails to comply with an order made by the Board within ten days must pay back pay to the employees affected by their unfair labor practice, as determined by the Board, as well as a $10,000 civil fine directly to the Board. The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order, [and~~] for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, for the back pay and fines that are owed, and shall file in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.
(j) The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) charging that any [person] employer has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
(l) Whenever it is charged that any [person] employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) of this title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining order under section 158(b)(7) of this title if a charge against the employer under section 158(a)(2) of this title has been filed and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(D) of this title.
(b) 29 U.S. Code § 162, is amended to read as follows—
(a) Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this subchapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(b) Any employer who commits an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than $100,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both or, if another unfair labor practice has been committed in the last five years by the employer, a fine of not more than $200,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.
(c) Any person who incurs physical or monetary harm by reason of an unfair labor practice as defined by section 158 of this title may, after thirty days following filing such practices with the Board, bring a civil action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction and, if such court deems that the unfair labor practice did occur, is entitled to back pay without reduction, consequential damages, punitive damages based upon the severity of the violation, the impact of the violation, and the income of the employer, attorney’s fees, and any other relief deemed necessary by the court.
SECTION 7. SEVERABILITY
(a) If any provision of this act shall be found unconstitutional, unenforceable, or otherwise stricken, the remainder of the act shall remain in full force and effect.
SECTION 8. ENACTMENT
(a) This act shall take effect ninety days following its successful passage.
(b) This act shall take precedence over all other pieces of legislation that might contradict it.
This act is written and sponsored by Sen. darthholo (S-AC) and is cosponsored by Rep. Duce_de_Zoop (S-US), Rep. PGF3 (S-AC-2), Rep. pik_09 (S-US), Rep. brihimia (S-DX-2), Rep. KellinQuinn__ (D-AC-3), Sen. Tucklet1911 (S-CH).
The Act, which has not been amended by this Committee, is read above in its current form.
You will now vote on the Act, using the (Yea/Abstain/Nay) votes, in the comments below.
This thread will close at 5:55 PM EST Saturday.
submitted by Kingthero to ModelSenateFinanceCom [link] [comments]

See also (list is generated automatically): Affiliate confidential information – protected or not? (See also the sample clauses.) When negotiating a nondisclosure agreement (NDA), a disclosing party might plan on disclosing not only its own confidential information, but... Confidential Information Clauses – Understanding Your NDA UPDATE 2014-05-27: I think you’ll like the “new (ii) A business concern owned and controlled by an Indian Tribe, ANC, NHO, CDC, or by a wholly-owned entity of an Indian Tribe, ANC, NHO, or CDC, is not considered to be affiliated with another concern owned by that entity based solely on the contractual relations between the two concerns. The term “affiliate” is defined in Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 2017, by and among the Company, Napo, Napo Acquisition Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company, and Napo’s representative According to the agreement, an affiliate of Assurant has also agreed to make potential earnout payments, in an aggregate amount of up to USD25.0m in cash, to a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Walter, with the amount of such payments to be based upon the gross written premium of certain voluntary homeowners' insurance written by certain A wholly owned subsidiary is a company completely owned by another company. The company that owns the subsidiary is called the parent company or holding company .

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